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HUSKY INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONICS, INC. V. RITZ:
RETHINKING ACTUAL FRAUD, BADGES OF FRAUD, AND
PLEADING STANDARDS IN FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY
LITIGATION
MEAGAN GEORGE
Bankruptcy law seeks to achieve a balance between two undesirable
outcomes: debtors so encumbered by debt that they can never again become
productive, solvent members of society and rightful creditors being unable
to collect on the loan that they extended with the expectation of being
repaid.1 In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act to amend
the existing Federal Bankruptcy Code.2 One of the amendments Congress
made was in Section 523(a)(2)(A), where it added “actual fraud” to a list of
actions excepting a debtor from discharge of their debt.3 The updated
Section 523(a)(2)(A) now states: “A discharge” of a debt under the
Bankruptcy Code “does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt . . . for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud . . . .”4
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1. Understanding Bankruptcy, BANKR. C.D. CAL., http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/
understanding-bankruptcy (last visited May 17, 2017) (“The primary purposes of the law of
bankruptcy are: to give an honest debtor a ‘fresh start’ in life by relieving the debtor of most debts,
and to repay creditors in an orderly manner to the extent that the debtor has property available for
payment.”).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. Notably, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created the federal bankruptcy courts and “revised and codified
Title 11 of the U.S. Code which contained the substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy.”
Landmark Judicial Legislation: The Establishment of Bankruptcy Courts: “An Act to Establish an
Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies”, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/landmark_20.html (last visited May 17, 2017).
3. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 78 (1978) (“‘[A]ctual fraud’ is added as a ground for exception
from discharge.”).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012).
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The meaning of “actual fraud” in this context has been an area of
contention since the term’s addition in 1978.5 Federal courts of appeal have
disagreed over whether actual fraud requires the debtor to make a
misrepresentation to her creditor.6 In Husky International Electronics, Inc.
v. Ritz,7 the Supreme Court settled this dispute, holding that actual fraud
does not require a misrepresentation to the creditor.8 The Court thereby
created the option of recovery for creditors under Section 523(a)(2)(A) even
where they had not been directly lied to, as long as the debtor still
implemented actual fraud in relation to its debt.9
The Supreme Court came to the right decision in its holding in Husky,
but it also opened the door to creditor recovery under Section 523(a)(2)(A)
in situations where a debtor might be innocent but vulnerable.10 This overly
wide net is a result of “badges of fraud,” a set of objective factors courts
and state legislatures have used to evaluate fraud in bankruptcy.11 When
taken in aggregate, badges of fraud indicate that a debtor was fraudulent,
but they could also be present due to circumstances completely unrelated to
fraud.12 To remedy this disconnect between the intentional fraud that
Congress meant to prevent with Section 523(a)(2)(A) and the types of
debtors that can now be held liable under it, Congress should enact a new
pleading standard similar to that used in securities litigation.13 Private
securities litigants must plead a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent,14
which places more responsibility on judges and juries to determine whether
the debtor had intent to act fraudulently, rather than unwittingly meeting a
list of “badges of fraud.”15 A “strong inference” pleading standard would
5. See infra Part I; see also Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (2016)
(“Although ‘fraud’ connotes deception or trickery generally, the term is difficult to define more
precisely.”).
6. See generally Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995) (holding that a creditor must justifiably
rely on a debtor’s representation for that debt to be excepted from discharge under Section
523(a)(2)(A)); McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that actual fraud
under Section 523(a)(2)(A) is not limited to misrepresentations); In re Lawson, 791 F.3d 214 (1st
Cir. 2015) (holding that actual fraud under Section 523(a)(2)(A) is broader than
misrepresentations).
7. 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).
8. Id. at 1590.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1987) (integrating badges of
fraud into its exception to discharge statute).
12. Brief of Amicus Curiae The National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys in
Support of the Respondent, Daniel Lee Ritz, Jr. at 5, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct.
1581 (2016) (No. 15-145), [hereinafter Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Brief] (“Every constructive
fraudulent conveyance will too readily become recast as ‘actual fraud’ . . . .”).
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2012).
15. See infra Part II.C.3.
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reduce instances of litigation abuse and clearly set the tone of Congress’s
objectives for its inclusion of “actual fraud” in Section 523(a)(2)(A).16
I. BACKGROUND
This Part will discuss the development of the term “actual fraud” and
its meaning under Section 523(a)(2)(A). First, it will look at common law
interpretations of “actual fraud,” which the Supreme Court relied upon in
Husky.17 Second, it will examine Congress’s purpose in adding actual fraud
to Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.18 Next, it
will highlight the differences in interpretation among the Federal Courts of
Appeals as to the meaning of actual fraud and its place in Section
523(a)(2)(A).19 Finally, it will summarize the Husky case, its procedural
background, and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in deciding that actual
fraud does not require a misrepresentation.20
A. The Evolution of “Actual Fraud” in Bankruptcy Cases at Common
Law
Actual fraud is a “common-law term.”21 The Supreme Court
traditionally interprets common law terms to “imply elements that the
common law has defined them to include.”22 American bankruptcy law has,
since its beginning, drawn on Statute of 13 Elizabeth, written in England
during the sixteenth century.23 In relevant part, Statute of 13 Elizabeth
“invalidate[s] ‘covinous and fraudulent’ transfers designed ‘to delay, hinder
or defraud creditors and others.’”24 Most American bankruptcy and
fraudulent transfer statutes are modeled after Statute of 13 Elizabeth
because they include a “fraudulent transfer” exception to discharge.25
Because fraudulent transfer exceptions to discharge have been a

16. Id.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Part I.C–D.
20. See infra Part I.E–F.
21. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1586–88 (2016) (discussing how
common law has defined “actual” and “fraud” to arrive at a common law meaning of “actual
fraud”).
22. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995).
23. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 540 (1994).
24. Id. (quoting 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570)).
25. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1505–06 (1st Cir. 1987); see, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 109A, § 3 (1996) (replicating Statute of 13 Elizabeth’s language in its
fraudulent transfer statute).
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fundamental piece of bankruptcy law from the start, the Supreme Court has
generally relied on Statute of 13 Elizabeth as an interpretive guide.26
Actual fraud was further defined in Neal v. Clark27 in 1877. The
Supreme Court in Neal held that the defendant was not guilty of “actual
fraud” because he “[did] not show that he entertained any purpose himself
to commit a fraud, or to aid . . . in committing one.”28 The Court found that
actual fraud, unlike constructive fraud, includes behavior “involving moral
turpitude or intentional wrong,” such as embezzlement.29 Neal suggests
that actual fraud is not a question of merely the actus reus.30 It requires
mens rea and is distinct from constructive fraud.31 Neal is crucial to the
interpretation of “actual fraud” in this context because it was the blueprint
for Section 523(a)(2)(A).32
Many courts, when interpreting a statute’s common law terms, look to
the Restatement of the statute’s respective area of law as a reference point
for the term’s general common law meaning.33 When Congress amended
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts defined fraudulent misrepresentations.34 It
did not, however, reference the term “actual fraud.”35

26. Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587.
27. 95 U.S. 704 (1877).
28. Id. at 707.
29. Id. at 709.
30. Id. at 707 (discussing that the defendant “purchased the bonds in good faith, not doubting
the power or the right of the executor to sell, and having no reason to believe that he meditated
any wrong to those interested in the estate which he was administering.”).
31. Id. at 709 (explaining that “fraud” in the statute at issue meant “positive fraud, or fraud in
fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong . . . not implied fraud, or fraud in law, which
may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.”).
32. 124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (“Subparagraph (A) [of § 523] is intended to codify
current case law e.g., Neal v. Clark, which interprets ‘fraud’ to mean actual or positive fraud
rather than fraud implied in law.” (citation omitted) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1887)).
33. Restatements are “influential treatises published by the American Law Institute
describing the law in a given area and guiding its development” which are “frequently cited in
cases and commentary.” Restatement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (defining fraudulent
misrepresentation as “mak[ing] a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law for the
purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from action in reliance upon it”).
35. See generally id. Because the Court did not have a clear Restatement definition to work
with when interpreting what “actual fraud” meant in Husky, it had to look into other common law
sources, such as Statute of 13 Elizabeth, and employ other canons of construction, such as the
section’s syntax, to discern the meaning of the term. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct.
1581, 1586–88 (2016).
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B. The Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and
Its Implications for the Court’s Interpretation of Section
523(a)(2)(A)
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to
amend the Federal Bankruptcy Code.36 According to the Court, “[w]hen
Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to
have real and substantial effect.”37 Before the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
Section 523(a)(2)(A) included “false pretenses” and “false
representations.”38 The term “actual fraud” was “added as a ground for
exception from discharge” during the amendment process.39 Congress
noted the potential for abuse of Section 523(a)(2)(A) by creditors, but still
reinforced their position that debts obtained by “false pretenses, false
representations, or actual fraud” should be excepted from discharge.40
Congress’s purpose was not to limit the types of “actual fraud” that could
be brought as an exception.41
C. The Court Interpreted Section 523(a)(2)(A) Narrowly in Field v.
Mans
In Field v. Mans,42 a Supreme Court case from 1995, the plaintiffs
were actively misled by defendant through a letter asking them to waive
their right of sale on their real estate property, after defendant had already
sold the property without plaintiffs’ consent.43 The Court in Field held that
the plaintiffs needed to show justifiable reliance on a debtor’s
misrepresentation for the debt to be excepted from discharge under Section
523(a)(2)(A).44 That was the extent of the Court’s holding.45 The Court did
not consider whether a misrepresentation was necessary for eligibility for
exception from discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A); the Court only

36. S. REP. NO. 95-989 (1978).
37. Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (citations omitted) (citing Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 109–11 (1990); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)).
38. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 78 (1978).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Congress wanted exceptions from discharge where “discharge would violate the
bankruptcy objective of giving a fresh start only to honest debtors,” including fraud. H.R. REP.
NO. 102-1085, 102nd Cong., at 50–51 (1992).
42. 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
43. Id. at 61–62.
44. Id. at 61.
45. Id. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing how the only issue resolved was the level
of reliance and that the court did not take up any causation questions once it resolved the level of
reliance needed).
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considered the level of reliance a creditor must put on a misrepresentation,
if there was one, for the debt to be excepted from discharge.46
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg recognized the limits of the
Court’s holding in Field and foreshadowed the uncertainties of Section
523(a)(2)(A) that would later be at issue in Husky.47 She expressly stated
that the Court, in Field, had only answered the question of the necessary
level of reliance on a misrepresentation when the creditor’s claim is based
upon a misrepresentation.48 She concluded that the “unsettled causation”
issue is not resolved and must be decided in another case.49
D. The Seventh and First Circuits Interpret Section 523(a)(2)(A) as
Not Requiring a Misrepresentation for Actual Fraud
Five years after the Supreme Court heard Field v. Mans, federal
appellate courts began deciding cases involving the “unsettled causation”
issues, as Justice Ginsburg anticipated.50 In McClellan v. Cantrell,51 the
Seventh Circuit held that “actual fraud” is “not limited to
misrepresentations and misleading omissions.”52 It gave weight to the fact
that Congress added “actual fraud” into the statute during the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, concluding that, “by distinguishing between ‘a false
representation’ and ‘actual fraud,’ the statute makes clear that actual fraud
is broader than misrepresentation.”53
The First Circuit heard a similar case, In re Lawson,54 at the same time
the Supreme Court heard Husky.55 The First Circuit, like the Seventh
Circuit, held that “‘actual fraud’ under [Section] 523(a)(2)(A) is not limited
to fraud effected by misrepresentation.”56 The court found that the “fraud”

46. Id. at 73–75 (holding narrowly that “[Section] 523(a)(2)(A) requires justifiable, but not
reasonable, reliance” and vacating and remanding the case for the lower court to evaluate
plaintiffs’ reliance on defendants’ misrepresentation using a justifiable reliance standard).
47. Id. at 78–79.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., In re Lawson, 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015); In re Ritz, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir.
2015); McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000).
51. McClellan, 217 F.3d 890.
52. Id. at 893.
53. Id. The bankruptcy court that heard McClellan before its appeal to the Seventh Circuit
read Field v. Mans to mean that a debt could not be excepted from discharge without a “showing
of material misrepresentation and reliance on the statement.” Id. at 892. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed with this interpretation because, as noted by Justice Ginsburg, Field dealt only with “the
nature of the reliance that a plaintiff must show to prove fraud in [a Section 523(a)(2)(A)] case.”
The Seventh Circuit concluded that “Field has nothing to do with this case.” Id.
54. 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 220.
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definition in the Restatement of Torts dealt with fraud broader than just
misrepresentations, including “fraudulent interference with property
rights.”57 It also relied on Collier on Bankruptcy, a leading bankruptcy
treatise, which provides, “[a]ctual fraud, by definition, consists of any
deceit, artifice, trick, or design involving direct and active operation of the
mind, used to circumvent and cheat another.”58 By using these common
law sources, the First Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit.59
E. Lower Court Decisions in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v.
Ritz
In In re Ritz,60 the case that would ultimately become Husky
International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion of the First and Seventh Circuit regarding the misrepresentation
question.61 It found that, for a debt to be excepted from discharge under
Section 523(a)(2)(A), there must be a misrepresentation and actual fraud
does not include any fraudulent acts other than misrepresentation for the
purpose of Section 523(a)(2)(A).62 To fully appreciate the scope of the
issue presented in Husky, a detailed discussion of the case at issue follows.
Defendant Daniel Lee Ritz Jr. (“Ritz”) was a director of Chrysalis
Manufacturing Corp. (“Chrysalis”).63 He was also in financial control of
Chrysalis and owned at least thirty percent of its common stock during the
relevant period.64 The plaintiff, Husky International Electronics, Inc.
(“Husky”), contracted to sell and deliver electronic device components to
Chrysalis, and transacted with Chrysalis from 2003 through 2007.65
Chrysalis failed to pay Husky for $163,999 worth of components.66 Husky
sued Chrysalis to recover that debt in May of 2009.67 Unfortunately for

57. Id. at 219 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, index, “Fraud” (AM. LAW INST.
1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 871 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
58. Id. (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.08(1)(e) (Alan A. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2015)).
59. Id. at 216 n.1.
60. 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v.
Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).
61. Id. at 321 (“For all of these reasons, we conclude that a representation is a necessary
prerequisite for a showing of ‘actual fraud’ under Section 523(a)(2)(A).”).
62. Id.
63. In re Ritz, 459 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 513 B.R. 510 (S.D. Tex.
2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc.
v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re Ritz, No. 14-20526, 2016
WL 4253552 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016).
64. Id. at 627.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. In re Ritz, 513 B.R. at 523–24.
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Husky, Ritz transferred hundreds of thousands of dollars of Chrysalis’s
assets to seven other companies, which he also controlled, between
November of 2006 and May of 2007, and ignored Chrysalis’s debts.68 After
Husky sued to recover its debts, Ritz filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.69
Husky filed an adversary proceeding to Ritz’s bankruptcy claim to recover
the $163,999 owed by Chrysalis, hoping to pierce the corporate veil and
hold Ritz personally liable for Chrysalis’s debts.70
This case began in Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Texas
in 2011, where Ritz’s bankruptcy case was “routine” until Husky filed its
adversary proceeding.71 Husky pursued several different routes to recover
its debts.72 The bankruptcy court quickly dismissed Husky’s attempt to
recover under Section 523(a)(4), an exception to discharge limited to parties
with a fiduciary relationship, which did not apply because there was no
fiduciary relationship between the parties.73 The second route and the true
area of contention in this case was whether Ritz’s fraudulent transfer of
Chrysalis’s assets to his other companies fell within the scope of the
meaning of “actual fraud” in Section 523(a)(2)(A).74 The Bankruptcy Court
found that Husky could not recover under Section 523(a)(2)(A) because,
according to Texas law, “actual fraud” requires a false representation
intended to induce the creditor to enter into a debt agreement.75 Because
there was no evidence of a representation made by Ritz to induce Husky to
enter into the contract, Husky could not recover under the “actual fraud”
language in Section 523(a)(2)(A).76

68. In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 628.
69. Id. at 627.
70. Id. Adversary proceedings include, among other things, actions “to determine the
dischargeability of a debt” or “to object to or revoke a discharge.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
“Piercing the corporate veil” refers to the principle that “the corporate veil may be pierced and the
[owner] held liable for the corporation’s conduct when . . . the corporate form would otherwise be
misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, on the shareholder’s
behalf.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 52 (1998). According to current case law, the
Texas Business Organizations Code (“TBOC”) allows for the corporate veil to be pierced if “(1)
the corporation is the alter ego of its owners and/or shareholders; (2) the corporation is used for
illegal purposes; and (3) the corporation is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud” and “the
defendant shareholder ‘caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did
perpetrate an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder.’”
In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 632 (quoting Rimade Ltd. v. Hubbard Enters. Inc., 388 F.3d 138, 143 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
71. In re Ritz, 459 B.R. at 627.
72. Id. at 632–33.
73. Id. at 633.
74. Id. at 632–33.
75. Id. at 633.
76. Id.
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Husky appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court.77 Slightly
straying from the bankruptcy court’s course of logic, the district court
acknowledged that there are cases where a party can pierce the corporate
veil because of actual fraud without a misrepresentation.78 The district
court did not find that there was actual fraud, however.79 Instead, it
followed the canon of construction that a statute created by Congress must
be interpreted according to its common law meaning.80 In this case, the
district court relied on The Restatement (Second) of Torts.81 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts only references fraudulent misrepresentation,
not actual fraud.82
The district court, therefore, held that a
misrepresentation was necessary to show actual fraud.83 Because Husky
provided no evidence of a misrepresentation, the court concluded, Ritz
could discharge its debt.84 Husky appealed to the Fifth Circuit.85
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy and district
courts.86 The Fifth Circuit held that Congress did not intend for fraudulent
transfers to fall within the scope of “actual fraud” in Section 523(a)(2)(A)
because another provision of the Bankruptcy Code, Section 727(a)(2),
prohibits discharge of debt involving fraudulent transfers, and statutes
should be construed to avoid redundancy.87
The Fifth Circuit
acknowledged its decision was in conflict with the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in McClellan v. Cantrell, which expanded the interpretation of
“actual fraud” to include fraudulent transfers.88 It contended, however, that
McClellan contradicted the Supreme Court’s decision in Field v. Mans.89
Finally, the Fifth Circuit felt it was important to honor the purpose of
bankruptcy law, which is to give the debtor a clean start.90 To achieve this,

77. In re Ritz, 513 B.R. 510, 517 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), vacated and
remanded sub nom. In re Ritz, No. 14-20526, 2016 WL 4253552 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016).
78. Id. at 537.
79. Id. at 538.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 539.
85. In re Ritz, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l
Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re Ritz, No. 1420526, 2016 WL 4253552 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016).
86. Id. at 314.
87. Id. at 320–21.
88. Id. at 317.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 321.
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courts should err on the side of giving debtors the opportunity to start anew
when considering an ambiguity in the statute.91 Recognizing the need to
resolve the circuit split regarding the issue of “actual fraud,” the Supreme
Court granted Husky’s petition for certiorari.92
F. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Husky International Electronics,
Inc. v. Ritz
In Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, the Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that the term “actual fraud” in
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code includes schemes like
fraudulent transfers where no misrepresentation is involved.93 The Court
first analyzed the meaning of “actual fraud” under the common law, then
interpreted it within the context of the rest of the Bankruptcy Code.94 It
concluded that neither the common law nor the Bankruptcy Code precludes
actual fraud from including fraudulent transfer schemes or other types of
fraud without misrepresentations.95
The Court relied on the general principle that the judiciary interprets
statutes based upon their common law meanings, so the Court split up the
term “actual fraud” into “actual” and “fraud” in an effort to discern the most
accurate common law meaning for the term.96 In the fraud context,
“actual,” in contrast with “constructive,” refers to behavior that “involv[es]
moral turpitude or intentional wrong.”97 As for “fraud,” bankruptcy
common law has always recognized the transfer of assets to impede a
creditor’s ability to collect its debts as “fraud.”98 The Court referred to
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, which it described as deeply influential in modern
bankruptcy law, to show the long-standing concept that transfers to hide
assets from creditors is fraud.99 The Court also noted that common law
indicates that fraudulent transfers do not require a misrepresentation to be
considered fraud.100 In this case, the Court noted that the common law
reflects common sense because the wrongfulness of a fraudulent transfer
like Ritz’s is not in the inducement to enter into a contract, but in the
91. Id.
92. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (2016).
93. Id. at 1590.
94. Id. at 1586–89.
95. Id. at 1590.
96. Id. at 1586.
97. Id. (quoting Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878)).
98. Id. (noting that the historical meaning of “actual fraud” has included within its scope “a
transfer scheme designed to hinder the collection of debt”).
99. Id. at 1587.
100. Id. (“[T]he common law also indicates that fraudulent conveyances, although a ‘fraud,’
do not require a misrepresentation from a debtor to a creditor.”).
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secrecy of hiding assets.101 Opportunities for representations are limited in
a fraudulent transfer, so representations are not a “defining feature of this
type of fraud.”102
After the Court determined that the common law does not exclude
fraudulent conveyances from “actual fraud,” it examined how “actual
fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) fits into the scheme of the Bankruptcy
Code and whether construing “actual fraud” broadly to include fraudulent
transfers was logical under the statutory scheme.103 The defendant
contended that that interpreting “actual fraud” to include fraudulent
conveyances would be duplicative of other provisions in the bankruptcy
code; namely Sections 523(a)(4), 523(a)(6), or 727(a)(2).104 The Court
discussed meaningful differences between Section 523(a)(2)(A) and these
other sections, and concluded that, just because the provisions cover
transfers or conveyances does not make them redundant.105 For example,
Section 523(a)(4) only covers fraud while acting as a fiduciary, while
523(a)(2)(A) has no such limitations.106 Section 523(a)(6) covers willful
and malicious injury, regardless of whether the injury was a result of fraud;
Section 523(a)(2)(A) only covers fraudulent acts.107 Section 727(a) is
broader than Section 523(a)(2)(A) in that it prevents a debtor from
discharging all debts, but narrower because it limits the fraudulent time
frame of relevance to one year.108 The separate sections of the statute all
have meaningful differences, indicating that recognition of fraudulent
transfers under Section 523(a)(2)(A) would not be redundant.109
The defendant also argued that Section 523(a)(2)(A) cannot include
conveyances because it is limited to debt “obtained by” fraud, and in a
fraudulent conveyance, the debt is already possessed.110 The Court declined
to follow this argument based on two cases. First, it cited McClellan v.
Cantrell for the proposition that a third party who receives assets from a
fraudulent transfer is someone who “obtained” debt by fraud, which leads
to the conclusion that the “obtained by” language is not “wholly
incompatible” with fraudulent transfers.111 Then, the Court disputed the

101. Id. (“In such cases, the fraudulent conduct is not in dishonestly inducing a creditor to
extend a debt. It is in the acts of concealment and hindrance.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1588–89.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1588.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1588–89.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1589.
111. Id.
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defendant’s reliance upon Field v. Mans, which the defendant cited as
support for the rule that actual fraud must relate to the “inception of a credit
transaction.”112 The Court distinguished the rule created in Field, because it
only applies where fraud is perpetrated by a misrepresentation to a creditor,
not in all cases under Section 523(a)(2)(A).113
The Court concluded by discrediting the defendant’s final argument:
that Congress intended the phrase “or actual fraud” to mean “by actual
fraud.”114 The Court noted that Ritz’s statutory interpretation argument was
unprecedented and would not work in this situation.115 After rejecting all of
the defendant’s interpretive hurdles obstructing fraudulent conveyance’s
inclusion in “actual fraud,” the Court concluded that fraudulent
conveyances are within the scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A) and reversed and
remanded the case.116
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter in Husky, believed that the
“obtained by” language was meant by Congress to be an important
limitation on the scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A) and argued that the majority
improperly broadened the reach of the statute.117 He did not consider the
“reliance” standard set forth in Field to be distinguishable from the case at
hand.118 He argued that “actual fraud” “subsumes ‘false pretenses’ and
‘false representations,’” and should therefore not be considered a separate
cause of action.119 He concluded that if Congress had wanted a debtor to be
prohibited from discharging debt concealed through a fraudulent
conveyance, it would have written that language into the statute.120 Because
Congress chose not to write this into the statute, Justice Thomas believed
that the majority was overstepping its boundaries and into legislative
territory by over-broadening the meaning of Section 523(a)(2)(A).121
II. ANALYSIS
This Part will first discuss why the Supreme Court was correct in
holding that actual fraud does not require a misrepresentation by a debtor to

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1590.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1590–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority dispelled this argument by noting
that “[n]othing in the text of § 523(a)(2) supports that additional requirement.” Id. at 1589
(majority opinion).
118. Id. at 1592–93 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1593.
120. Id. at 1593–94.
121. Id. at 1594.
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its creditor.122 Next, it will posit that, while the Supreme Court was correct,
its holding will apply to cases beyond Congress’s intended scope for
Section 523(a)(2)(A) because of deficiencies inherent in the “badges of
fraud” approach used by courts to evaluate fraudulent intent.123 It will then
consider the need for a new standard of fraud and draw parallel objectives
between Section 523(a)(2)(A) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (“PSLRA”).124 Finally, it will suggest that courts and legislatures
should adopt the PSLRA’s “strong inference” of fraudulent intent pleading
standard as the solution to the weaknesses using badges of fraud creates.125
A. The Supreme Court Decided the “Actual Fraud” Debate Correctly
The Husky Court examined a very narrow issue: whether “actual
fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) is limited to misrepresentations.126 The
Court correctly found that actual fraud is not limited to misrepresentation.
First, the common law, which Congress intended to codify by enacting the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, never limited actual fraud to
misrepresentations.127
Second, according to statutory canons of
construction, “or” phrases should be treated as expansive, rather than
limiting.128 Third, limiting “actual fraud” to misrepresentations would
allow debtors to discharge themselves of debt in ways that Congress did not
intend.129
1.

Common Law Meaning of “Actual Fraud” and Legislative
Intent

Most American law regarding fraudulent conveyances can trace its
roots to Statute of 13 Elizabeth,130 which recognized fraudulent
conveyances as activity done with intent to delay, hinder or defraud.131
Because Statute of 13 Elizabeth has influenced so many American
fraudulent conveyance statutes,132 it is a reasonable touchstone for a
common law definition of fraud.133

122. See infra Part II.A.
123. See infra Part II.B.
124. See infra Part II.C; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
125. See infra Part II.C.3–5.
126. Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1585 (majority opinion).
127. See infra Part II.A.1.
128. See infra Part II.A.2.
129. See infra Part II.A.3.
130. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
131. Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587.
132. See PETER A. ALCES, LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS § 5:32, Westlaw (database
updated Aug. 2016) (discussing how both the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act and Uniform
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Congress, when enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
intended for Section 523(a)(2)(A) to “codify current case law e.g., Neal v.
Clark, which interprets ‘fraud’ to mean actual or positive fraud rather than
fraud implied in law.”134 Congress was not concerned with limiting “fraud”
to misrepresentation, but rather wanted to ensure that the statute penalized
the correct level of intent.135 Because the common law meaning of “actual
fraud” logically includes fraudulent conveyances136 and Congress did not
intend to limit Section 523(a)(2)(A) to misrepresentations,137 the Supreme
Court correctly found that the term “actual fraud” could include fraudulent
conveyances.
2. Cannons of Construction
There are two canons of construction used in statutory interpretation
that further support the argument that the Supreme Court was accurate in its
interpretation of Section 523(a)(2)(A). First, courts should not render any
terms in the statute as surplusage.138 That is, “a statute ought, upon the
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word will be superfluous, void, nugatory, or insignificant.”139 Because
Congress specifically added the term “or actual fraud” in 1978140 and the
term “misrepresentation” precedes “actual fraud” in a disjunctive list,141 if
the Court had found “actual fraud” to be limited to misrepresentations, it
would have rendered the phrase “or actual fraud” to be superfluous.

Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with several state fraudulent transfer statutes, have incorporated
language from Statute of 13 Elizabeth).
133. Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587.
134. 124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (citation omitted) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704
(1887)).
135. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting the reason for including actual fraud
was to capture actions perpetrated with “moral turpitude or intentional wrong”).
136. Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 57 LA. L. REV. 1213,
1216 (1997) (discussing how actual fraud and fraudulent transfer law both have their roots in
Statute 13 of Elizabeth).
137. Congress’s choice to say it “added” actual fraud to 523(a)(2)(A), rather than saying it was
using actual fraud to clarify or limit false pretenses or false representations, suggests that actual
fraud is a different cause of action than false pretenses or false representation. See S. REP. NO. 95989, at 78 (1978) (discussing that the provision excepting discharge where the debtor used false
pretenses or false representations has been “modified only slightly” as “actual fraud is added as a
ground for exception from discharge”).
138. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 433 (2016).
139. Id.
140. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 78 (1978) (“‘[A]ctual fraud’ is added as a ground for exception
from discharge.”).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012). A disjunctive list “express[es] an alternative or
opposition between the meanings of the words connected.” Disjunctive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (2017).
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The second relevant canon of construction is the meaning of the
disjunctive article “or.” “Or” is used to signify that “only one of the listed
requirements need be satisfied.”142 This suggests that when Congress added
“or actual fraud” to Section 523(a)(2)(A), it meant to expand the exceptions
to discharge to include “actual fraud,” and not to limit the scope of the
provision, as Justice Thomas suggested in his dissent.143 While some states
did away with the distinction between “and” and “or,” there is generally no
need to read a different meaning into an article unless it is necessary for the
statute to reach its intended purpose.144 In Section 523(a)(2)(A), there is no
need to read “or” to mean “and” or “by,” because Congress’s goal was to
add actual fraud as a ground for exception to discharge.145
3.

Consequences
Misrepresentations

of

Limiting

“Actual

Fraud”

to

The purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act, as mentioned
above, is to balance the interests of debtors who need a fresh start and
creditors who are rightfully owed repayment on their loans.146 Congress, in
enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act, has created numerous exceptions to
discharge where it finds the debtors are not entitled to a fresh start because
of the debtors’ conduct.147 Congress could not have intended, when writing
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, to allow debtors to escape fulfilling their
obligations merely by moving their assets, as defendant Ritz did.148 If the
Supreme Court had resolved Husky on different grounds, however, it would
have been condoning such behavior.149 While Ritz argued that it would be
redundant for Section 523(a)(2)(A) to be read this way when Section
727(a)(2) exists,150 creditors need a remedy for fraudulent transfers
occurring outside of the year before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, as was
142. LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 9 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97589.pdf.
143. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590–94 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s dissenting
opinion).
144. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEO. L.J. 341, 358 n.80, 360 (2010) (noting that “or” should be used in its disjunctive meaning
unless the context of a statute clearly indicates otherwise).
145. See supra note 137.
146. See Understanding Bankruptcy, supra note 1.
147. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727, 1228(a), 1228(b), 1328(b) (2012).
148. Experts Discuss Supreme Court’s Ruling in Husky International Electronics Inc. v. Ritz
and Its Impact on Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, AM. BANKR. INST. (Dec. 18, 2016)
[hereinafter Experts Discuss Husky], http://www.abi.org/educational-brief/experts-discusssupreme-courts-ruling-in-husky-international-electronics-inc-v.
149. Id.
150. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1588–89 (2016).
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the case in Husky. Otherwise, creditors that extended credit years prior to a
debtor filing bankruptcy, but who still rightfully expect to be repaid, would
have no remedy. Congress likely did not intend to permit discharge of debt
related to fraudulent transfers simply because the debtor found a
loophole.151
B. Section 523(a)(2)(A), As Interpreted By Husky, Is Too Broad
1. Badges of Fraud
Though the Supreme Court was correct in its decision that actual fraud
is not limited to misrepresentations, concern over whether Section
523(a)(2)(A) will become too far-reaching is well founded.152 Lower courts
are starting to adopt Husky as precedent for fraudulent transfer bankruptcy
cases beyond the Court’s narrow decision.153 Had the Court decided that
actual fraud was limited to misrepresentations, there would be a bright line
test to determine whether a debtor’s actions fell under Section 523(a)(2)(A),
because a misrepresentation, by its nature, is an affirmative fraudulent act,
done to a specific creditor.154 If the actual fraud involved is a fraudulent
transfer rather than a misrepresentation, as in Husky, then one could argue
that all of a debtor’s creditors are affected in the same way because the
transfer has removed that amount of assets from the bankruptcy estate as a
whole, disadvantaging all creditors.155
Reservations about Husky are valid, not because actual fraud is broader
than some circuits believed, but because of the common law standard of
deciding whether a conveyance was fraudulent.156 Many state fraudulent
transfer statutes, as well as the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act, rely on
circumstantial evidence referred to as “badges of fraud” to decide whether a

151. Andrew L. Van Houter, Reopening the Loophole: Avoiding Securities Fraud Debt
Through Bankruptcy, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1713, 1716 (2012) (“The underpinning of
[bankruptcy policy] is obvious; Congress created the discharge to give the honest debtor a fresh
start, but the dishonest debtor deserves no such protection.”).
152. Many experts think Husky “creates a lot more problems than it solves.” Diane Davis,
High Court’s Husky Is ‘Narrow,’ Leaves Unanswered Questions, 28 BLOOMBERG BANKR. L.
REP. 671, 671 (2016); see also Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148 (discussing bankruptcy
expert Professor G. Eric Brunstad Jr.’s reservations on the Supreme Court’s decision in Husky).
153. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 555 B.R. 1, 10 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2016) (expanding on issues
unresolved by Husky and stating, “there is no requirement that a creditor rely on the actual fraud”
or “that the debtor’s actual fraud induced the creditor”).
154. Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148 (opining that for actual fraud to be tied to a
particular debt there should be a nexus between the two, i.e. a misrepresentation).
155. Id. (Professor Casey, a supporter of the Supreme Court’s decision in Husky, admitting
that other creditors of Chrysalis could have mounted a similar claim to Husky’s based on the
Court’s decision).
156. See infra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
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transferor transferred his assets fraudulently.157 If multiple badges of fraud
are established, a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was fraudulent
arises.158 Rebutting a presumption based upon broad generalizations can
disadvantage vulnerable debtor defendants.159 As an example, this
Comment will use Texas’s Business and Commerce Code, which has
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), to demonstrate the
breadth of badges of fraud and consequences that arise from using them.160
The statute considers whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; (2) the debtor
retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer; (3) the transfer or obligation was concealed; (4) before
the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had
been sued or threatened with suit; (5) the transfer was of
substantially all the debtor’s assets; (6) the debtor absconded; (7)
the debtor removed or concealed assets; (8) the value of the
consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to
the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation
incurred; (9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly
after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; (10)
the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and (11) the debtor transferred the essential
assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an
insider of the debtor.161
The true purpose of excepting a debtor from discharge is to remove
bankruptcy’s protections from one who intentionally remove assets from
her creditor’s reach.162 In situations where debtors are vulnerable, however,
the badges of fraud, listed above, are overly broad.163 While Neal v. Clark
intended “actual fraud” to exclude “constructive fraud” and only include

157. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-23.4 (West 2015); 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). For a list of cases where “badges of fraud” have
been used as an evaluative measure, see 3B BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYER’S EDITION
§ 34:176, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2017).
158. Kelly v. Armstrong, 141 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir. 1998).
159. Removing the misrepresentation requirement while still using a “badges of fraud
approach . . . create[s] unjustified and unnecessary leverage in favor of creditors” because “[e]very
constructive fraudulent conveyance will too readily become recast as ‘actual fraud.’” Bankruptcy
Attorneys’ Brief, supra note 12, at 5.
160. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001 (West 1987).
161. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (West 1987). Other states have adopted similar
provisions. See generally 3B BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION, supra note 157, at
§ 34:46 (discussing cases and statutes that use badges of fraud).
162. Van Houter, supra note 151, at 1716 (noting that Congress’s goals in bankruptcy include
“preventing dishonest fraudsters from evading liability by hiding behind the bankruptcy code.”).
163. See infra Part II.

1182

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 76:1165

situations where debtors have malicious intent,164 using badges of fraud as
evidence for actual fraud does exactly the opposite: it captures constructive
fraud by looking to objective criteria, rather than intent.165 Using badges of
fraud will encompass situations Congress never intended to be within the
scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A).166 The following examples of cases that will
now fall under Section 523(a)(2)(A) are a few that have caused the most
concern for bankruptcy experts before, and in the wake of, Husky.167
2. Examples of Cases That Would Fall Within the Scope of Section
523(a)(2)(A) Post-Husky
a. The Insolvent but Generous Family Member
One situation that could arise if Section 523(a)(2)(A) continues to
apply the badges of fraud approach has been discussed on several occasions
by Professor G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.168 His major concern with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Husky is that it will capture innocent debtors whose
situations, by chance rather than intent, meet several badges of fraud and, as
lower income individuals are more vulnerable to predatory litigation by
creditors.169 His illustration of this problem involves a destitute mother, on
the verge of insolvency, whose son needs money for his own rent.170 She
gives him what little cash she might have.171 This mother likely has no
knowledge of the laws of bankruptcy or fraudulent transfers, but she may
have met up to five badges of fraud.172 Specifically, she transferred money
to an insider (her son); she likely did not alert her creditors, which would
permit them to claim the transfer was concealed; she might have given her
son the cash, even after a suit was filed against her because she valued
helping her son over her creditors and did not understand the gravity of the
situation; the transfer may have been most of the cash she had; or she might
have been insolvent or became insolvent shortly after giving her son the
money.173 While this mother might be uninformed, she likely did not intend
164. Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877).
165. Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Brief, supra note 12, at 5 (“Every constructive fraudulent
conveyance will too readily become recast as ‘actual fraud’ . . . .”).
166. See infra Part II.B.2.
167. Id.
168. Professor Brunstad is a partner with Dechert LLP, a bankruptcy professor at NYU School
of Law, and a contributor to the Collier treatise on bankruptcy law. G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.,
DECHERT, LLP, https://www.dechert.com/eric_brunstad/ (last visited May 17, 2017).
169. Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra text accompanying note 161 (listing the badges of fraud used by the State of
Texas).
173. Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 148.
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to deceive her creditors.174 Rather, she felt she needed to meet her
obligations of motherhood.175 This is a classic situation where a regular
person needs bankruptcy to achieve a fresh start and likely not the type of
situation that Congress intended to be excepted from discharge.176
b. Aggressive Creditor
Other bankruptcy experts are concerned about the “unjustified and
unnecessary leverage in favor of creditors” that the Court’s holding in
Husky creates.177 They argue that including fraudulent transfers in Section
523(a)(2)(A) will incentivize creditors to make loans to small business
owners on the verge of bankruptcy.178 Then, almost any move the
entrepreneurs make with the borrowed money in pursuit of reviving or
expanding their business could fall within several badges of fraud.179 If the
creditors can establish several badges of fraud and cast the business owner’s
actions as constructively fraudulent, then the business owner will likely be
unable to overcome that presumption because of the cost of litigation.180 If
the business owners cannot rebut the presumption the creditors have
created, the creditors have produced a win-win situation for themselves. If
the debtor can repay its debts, the creditors earn their fees. If the debtor
cannot pay its debts, the creditors can skim off the top of the bankruptcy
estate by filing under Section 523(a)(2)(A). When passing the Federal
Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress did not intend to hinder small
businesses, but rather to encourage them by relieving them of debt when
necessary.181 Congress could not have wanted creditors to have adversary
claims against every move a business makes, which is why it put “actual,”
and not “constructive,” fraud into the statute.182 This incongruity, again,
demonstrates the insufficiency of the badges of fraud approach.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Van Houter, supra note 151.
177. Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Brief, supra note 12, at 5.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7. Badges of fraud that would likely be implicated in this situation include:
transferred substantially all assets; removed or concealed assets; and became insolvent shortly
after transfer was made. Id.
180. Id. at 5 (“Every constructive fraudulent conveyance will too readily become recast as
‘actual fraud.’”).
181. APARNA MATHUR, BEYOND BANKRUPTCY: DOES THE BANKRUPTCY CODE PROVIDE A
FRESH START TO ENTREPRENEURS? 2 (2011) (“[T]he bankruptcy procedure provides failed
entrepreneurs the ability to get back on their feet by reducing or eliminating their pre-bankruptcy
debts.”).
182. 124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (noting that Section 523(a)(2)(A) was intended to include
actual or positive fraud, not constructive or implied fraud).
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c. Multiple Creditors
The Court’s holding in Husky creates another quandary, unrelated to
the application of badges of fraud, but still problematic because of the use
of that standard. Former Judge Eugene R. Wedoff posed the issue in a
debate analyzing Husky before the Court issued its opinion.183 What
happens if five creditors each give Company A $100 and Company A
fraudulently transfers $250 of that $500 to Company B?184 If “actual fraud”
was limited to misrepresentation, this kind of issue would not arise because
the misrepresentation that caused the assets to be unavailable would be
directed at a specific creditor.185 Because including fraudulent transfers in
Section 523(a)(2)(A) opens the possibility for multiple creditors to initiate
adverse proceedings on the same transfer, there needs to be a solution to
this type of situation.186 Professor Anthony Casey suggests that all of these
creditors should receive their pro rata share.187 The more creditors added to
the scenario, however, the more complicated the situation becomes.188 If
one hundred creditors make a claim to the transferred money, do they all
have the same right to those assets?189 Will Section 523(a)(2)(A) need to
accommodate class action suits?190 If one creditor can show she was
harmed more directly than another (for example, that she lent money more
closely to the time of filing for bankruptcy), is she entitled to a greater
portion of those assets?191 Though this issue is more procedural and less
substantially related to the badges of fraud, a new approach could solve this
problem, too.192
C. A New Standard of Fraud—PSLRA’s “Strong Inference” Pleading
Standard
The current standard for evaluating fraud in a fraudulent transfer,
which is now within the scope of Section 523(a)(2)(A), is insufficient.193

183. Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 183.
184. Id.
185. Removing the connection between the incurrence of the debt and the fraud makes Section
523(a)(2)(A) a “general dischargeability provision.” Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. Professor Anthony Casey is now a bankruptcy professor at the University of Chicago
School of Law, after having been a bankruptcy partner at Kirkland & Ellis, LLP. Anthony J.
Casey, UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/casey (last visited
May 17, 2017).
188. Experts Discuss Husky, supra note 183.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See infra Part II.
193. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Badges of fraud are too broad and do not fulfill the intent of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act to capture only actual, and not constructive, fraud.194 Courts
and legislatures could best meet Congress’s intentions by implementing a
new standard of fraud for fraudulent conveyances, as is necessary in light of
the Court’s holding in Husky. This new standard must meet several criteria.
It must protect the honest but unfortunate debtor, like the indigent mother in
Professor Brunstad’s hypothetical.195 It must prevent aggressive creditors
from manipulating small business owners into exception of discharge as a
result of constructive fraud.196 It must also protect similarly situated
creditors to settle some of the difficulties involved in Judge Wedoff’s
scenario in which a class of creditors stake claim to the same set of
assets.197 The new standard must give preference to the creditors actually
harmed, not to parasitic creditors trying to jump their place in line.
The new requirement must also effectuate Congress’s intention for
“actual fraud” by only including acts committed with malicious intent and
excluding acts that are merely constructively fraudulent.198 The badges of
fraud approach, by using circumstantial evidence that might not be an
indication of “moral turpitude,”199 fails to accomplish Congress’s purpose
of adding “or actual fraud” into Section 523(a)(2)(A) and implicates many
more parties than envisioned.200
There is also a need for Congress to more clearly define its purpose for
adding “actual fraud” to Section 523(a)(2)(A). Other areas of the
bankruptcy code, such as Section 548 involving fraudulent transfers, might
soon be affected by the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”), the
predecessor to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.201 The UVTA, as of
2014, completely removes a requirement of fraud to qualify for relief.202 As
states begin to adopt the UVTA, which does not require any showing of
actual fraud, and courts interpret the reach of exceptions to discharge
involving actual fraud following Husky, there will likely be considerable

194. See supra note 31.
195. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
196. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
197. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
198. 124 CONG. REC. 33,998 (1978) (explaining that Congress’s intent for including Section
523(a)(2)(A) was to capture actual fraud with harmful intent, not constructive fraud).
199. Neal, 95 U.S. at 709.
200. See supra Part II.B.2.
201. See, e.g., 2016 MICH. PUB. ACTS 552. See generally Goodbye UFTA, Hello UVTA,
PRACTICAL LAW FINANCE (July 24, 2014), WL Practical Law Article 7-575-2685 (discussing the
amendments the Uniform Law Commission has made to the UFTA).
202. Edwin E. Smith, The 2014 Amendments to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (And,
Before the Amendments, Known as the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act), 46 UCC L.J. 245
(2015), 46 No. 3 UCC L. J. ART 5.
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confusion in the bankruptcy field that needs to be addressed by a new
standard.
The objectives listed above can be satisfied by Congress taking action
to create a new pleading standard for actual fraud under Section
523(a)(2)(A) that replicates the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard,
discussed below.203 The PSLRA “strong inference” pleading standard
should be adopted as the gatekeeper to litigation, rather than
Section 523(a)(2)(A)’s “obtained by” language as Justice Thomas interprets
it because the majority in Husky, though only in dictum, made clear that
fraud is not necessary in the inducement of the extension of debt, a view
that, because of this dictum, could quickly and easily become the general
view.204 The strong inference standard would result in a holistic review of
every situation,205 rather than making conclusions based on facts that might
not be relevant to fraudulent intent.206
1. Brief Overview of Securities and Exchange Commision Acts and
Rule 10b-5
The Securities Act of 1933, also known as the “truth in securities act,”
was passed to “provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities
sold . . . and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof.”207 Congress then passed
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), “to provide for the
regulation of securities exchanges and . . . to prevent inequitable and unfair
practices on such exchanges and markets.”208 The 1934 Act also allows
private litigants to bring securities claims.209 Private litigants typically
bring securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section
10b of the 1934 Act.210 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 make employing
“manipulative and deceptive devices,” making untrue statements or
omissions, or engaging in fraudulent or deceitful actions “in connection
with the purchase of sale of any security” unlawful.211

203. See infra Part II.
204. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590–94 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The majority dispelled Justice Thomas’s interpretation because “[n]othing in the text of [Section]
523(a)(2) supports that additional requirement.” Id. at 1589 (majority opinion).
205. See infra Part II.C.3.
206. Id.
207. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74.
208. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
210. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
211. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

2017]

HUSKY INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONICS, INC. v. RITZ

1187

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was passed in 1995 in
“response to perceived abuses of securities fraud litigation.”212 When stock
prices plummeted, classes of shareholders, led by lawyers, brought
frivolous suits that corporations would settle simply to avoid costly
litigation.213 While Congress knew it needed to find a way to curb
meaningless suits, it also sought to protect shareholders’ ability to recover
on meritorious claims.214 What follows is a discussion on how Congress
struck that balance in the PSLRA, how the Court further clarified this
legislation, and how the PSLRA’s objectives were similar to the solutions
needed for Section 523(a)(2)(A) after Husky.215 This Comment contends
that the PSLRA standard of pleading fraud is the right answer for how
courts and legislatures should interpret fraudulent transfers in the
bankruptcy context.216
2. The PSLRA Requirements and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd.
The PSLRA states that “plaintiffs must ‘state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind,’” rather than only satisfying the requirement of Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.217 Congress intended for the term
“strong inference” to be a more stringent requirement than “generally”
pleading scienter.218 It did not, however, define what it meant by “strong
inference.”219 This led courts in different circuits to develop their own
standards of strong inference until the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.220
212. Sharon Nelles & Hilary Huber, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 653, 653 (2014) (quoting Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston,
230 F.R.D. 250, 258 (D. Mass. 2005)); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (enumerating requirements for private individuals to bring
securities law suits to reduce abusive litigation).
213. Nelles & Huber, supra note 212, at 653–54.
214. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
215. See infra Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3.
216. See infra Part II.C.4.
217. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2)). Rule 9(b) requires, “[i]n
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
218. Scienter is “the defendant’s intention ‘to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’” Tellabs, Inc.,
551 U.S. at 313 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12, 194 (1976)).
219. Id. at 314.
220. For example, before Tellabs, the Sixth Circuit evaluated whether there was a “strong
inference” of fraud by assessing competing inferences to determine which was the most plausible,
while the Seventh Circuit examined all allegations and then decided “whether collectively they
establish such an inference.” Id. at 317.
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In Tellabs, the plaintiff alleged that Tellabs, and derivatively, its CEO
and President, Richard Notebaert, violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and SEC Rule 10b-5.221 The plaintiff alleged that Tellabs lied to the
investing public about the value of Tellabs’ stock, the success of the
company’s operations, and its financials through misrepresentations.222
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that “strong inference”
under the PSLRA required a “cogent” inference of scienter that is “at least
as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged.”223 Additionally, the allegations must not be taken in isolation, but
looked at together to determine “whether all of the facts alleged, taken
collectively, give rise to strong inference of scienter.”224 The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case
for evaluation under the newly articulated pleading standard.225
3. Common Objectives of PSLRA and Section 523(a)(2)(A)
Congress faced similar issues when creating a new pleading standard
for the PSLRA as they now face after Husky’s broad interpretation of
Section 523(a)(2)(A). Both statutes arise out of a need to protect the rights
of plaintiffs who feel that they have been taken advantage of through fraud.
But both also address the need to balance those rights against the rights of
vulnerable defendants who may be subject to attack under these laws when
they have been operating legally.226 The PSLRA recognizes that the federal
securities laws are open to abuses by those trying to take advantage of the
system.227 For example, before the PSLRA was enacted, private litigants
frequently initiated “strike suits,”228 which sought to take advantage of large
corporations who would find it quicker and easier to settle with a client for
the “nuisance value” of the case rather than be threatened with potential

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 315–17.
Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 329.
EDWARD LABATON & NICOLE M. ZEISS, INTERPRETING THE PSLRA’S PLEADING
REQUIREMENTS AND LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISIONS (AM. LAW INST. 2002), Westlaw (“The
enactment of the PSLRA flowed from the perception, or misperception, that securities class
actions had become primarily controlled by plaintiffs’ attorneys without, at times, sufficient
regard for actionable culpability of the defendants.”); see supra note 1.
227. Congress passed the PSLRA to “prevent the abuse of federal securities laws by private
plaintiffs.” Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 2001).
228. A strike suit is a “suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid claim, brought
either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.” Suit,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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litigation.229 By elevating the required standard of pleading, Congress
removed the incentive to bring strike suits because plaintiffs would have to
actually demonstrate there was a “strong inference” of scienter, rather than
freely bring claims simply because a corporation’s stock price decreased.230
A similar need exists in limiting the scope of potential claims under
Section 523(a)(2)(A) now that the Court, in Husky, found there is no
misrepresentation limitation for actual fraud.231 The PSLRA and the Court
in Tellabs attempted to strike a balance between the rights of plaintiffs who
were truly harmed by fraudulent securities offerors and corporations acting
legally, but subjected to the ebbs and flows of the market and imperfect
business decisions. The courts and legislatures now need to find a balance
between the rights of those who extended credit in good faith and expected
to be repaid with the rights of vulnerable debtors who actually need the
protection of bankruptcy to get a fresh start.232 Because the standards of
fraud approach to evaluating the existence of actual fraud is too broad, like
the fraud pleading requirements in private securities litigation before the
PSLRA, adopting a standard akin to the PSLRA’s could better protect the
rights of creditors and debtors.
By adopting the Court’s interpretation of “strong inference” of
fraudulent intent in Tellabs as the standard for assessing whether a transfer
falls within the scope of “actual fraud,” the burden on defendants whose
actions appear to constitute “actual fraud” under the badges of fraud test,
but who actually act with honest intentions will be relieved. Judges and
juries would have the power, instead of merely identifying whether certain
outward indicia exist, to actually evaluate the situation as a whole and
determine whether the defendant’s conduct was that of fraud or simply that
of someone with an immense financial burden with no other way to turn.
4. The Benefits of Adopting Tellabs’ Pleading Standard for Section
523(a)(2)(A) Outweigh Concerns of Its Efficacy in the
Securities Context
Though there are valid concerns with Tellabs’s “strong inference” test,
they will not be as problematic when applied to Section 523(a)(2)(A) for

229. Nuisance value abuses involve “nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants,
vexatious discovery requests and manipulation by class action lawyers.” Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at
320 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)).
230. Id. at 313 (“Exacting pleading requirements are among the control measures Congress
included in the PSLRA.”).
231. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1590 (2016) (“[W]e interpret ‘actual
fraud’ to encompass fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a
false representation.”).
232. See Understanding Bankruptcy, supra note 1.
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several reasons.233 First, while the expansion of “actual fraud” under
Section 523(a)(2)(A) may lead to more litigation, it is a relatively narrow
issue.234 And, although the PSLRA was created as a global solution to
improve and restrain all private securities litigation, the “actual fraud”
element of Section 523(a)(2)(A) will only apply where a fraudulent transfer
did not occur within one year of the defendant filing for bankruptcy,235 and
where there was no misrepresentation.236 If either of these circumstances
are present, there will be a bright line test to determine liability which will
not require the same depth of consideration.
Additionally, using the “strong inference” pleading standard as a
gatekeeping function would clarify confusion that could stem from the
adoption of the UVTA and its omission of a fraud requirement.237 At least
one court, for example, has issued an opinion that obscured the distinction
between states that require fraud and those that do not.238 The confusion
regarding the diminishing role of fraud in the UVTA, compounded by
Husky heightening the importance of actual fraud, further demonstrates the
necessity that Congress affirmatively enact a new pleading standard to
eliminate any doubt about its objectives regarding the addition of “actual
fraud” to Section 523(a)(2)(A). Just as Congress enacted a pleading
standard for the PSLRA separate from other securities laws, it could do the
same for this narrow element of Section 523(a)(2)(A).239
5. Benefits of Using the Strong Inference Standard
Using the strong inference test from the PSLRA instead of the badges
of fraud test can, first, cure some of the reservations experts have had about
233. See infra notes 234–239 and accompanying text. See generally Arunesh Sohi, Circuits in
Disarray Before and After Tellabs v. Makor: A Call For the Supreme Court to Weigh in on
Securities Fraud Pleading Requirements Again, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (2010) (discussing the
changes circuits have made since Tellabs and how, even after making changes, the circuits are still
not in agreement on how to treat the “strong inference” standard).
234. Diane Davis, High Court’s Husky Is ‘Narrow,’ Leaves Unanswered Questions, 28
BLOOMBERG BANKR. L. REP. 671, 671 (2016) (observing that while Husky might “create more
problems than it solves,” the facts involved in cases implicating Husky’s decision are unique).
235. There is no need for an “actual fraud” inquiry if the transfer occurred within one year of
the creditor filing its petition. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A) (2012).
236. There is no need for an “actual fraud” inquiry if there has been an express
misrepresentation because that is already listed as its own cause of action under the statute. See
id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
237. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., No. 12-CV-2652, 2017 WL
82391 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017).
239. According to Bankruptcy Rule 7009, Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
applies to adversary proceedings. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7009; see also supra note 217 (discussing
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b) and Congress’s separate pleading standard for the
PSLRA).
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the Court’s holding in Husky and, second, address the growing divergence
in the meaning and use of actual fraud in bankruptcy. In Professor
Brunstad’s scenario, the crux of the problem was that the nearly insolvent
mother who lent her son money for rent had no fraudulent intent and likely
did not know that what she was doing could possibly subject her to an
exception from discharge.240 Under the badges of fraud test, though, the
satisfaction of badges of fraud would require her to bear the heavy burden
of overcoming a rebuttable presumption of fraud. If a court uses the strong
inference test, she would only have to prove that a reasonable person would
find her acting with fraudulent intent less likely than her acting with an
innocent frame of mind, arguably a lighter load to bear. In the National
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorney’s amicus brief in support of
Ritz, experts worried that creditors would use their superior bargaining
power to manipulate debtors, especially small and new business owners,
into situations where they could make transfers that would constitute
several badges of fraud while taking risks to revive their businesses.241
Similar to Professor Brunstad’s example above, the small business owners
would have an easier job of proving their innocent frame of mind under a
strong inference test than with badges of fraud. Additionally, if creditors
know that the debtors would have an easier time of proving their innocent
frame of mind in court, they might not extend predatory loans to those
businesses because their chances of having priority in the debtor’s
bankruptcy estate will be significantly decreased.
Judge Wedoff’s concern over how courts will apply Section
523(a)(2)(A) when multiple creditors claim they were affected by the same
fraudulent transfer is likely the trickiest of the issues posed. This too,
however, can be at least partially remedied by using the PSLRA’s strong
inference test. By giving the judge or jury more power to look into the
totality of the circumstances, rather than just tallying how many badges of
fraud are involved in a situation, they can look more deeply into how a
debtor’s scienter, or lack thereof, relates to any of the creditors filing
adverse proceedings individually. A judge or jury could consider the
circumstances and try to understand the state of mind of the debtor, which
would allow it to determine whether the fraudulent transfer was
intentionally done to defraud or disadvantage a specific creditor more so
than others.
The benefits of the strong inference standard would also apply to the
Husky case. Rather than looking to which badges of fraud Ritz met, the

240. See supra Part II.B.2.A.
241. Bankruptcy Attorneys’ Brief, supra note 12, at 7.
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Court could look broadly at all of his business endeavors,242 his lack of
trustworthiness,243 and the circumstances of his relationship with Husky.244
It would then be much easier for a judge or jury to find that Ritz did act
with scienter and that his debt to Husky should not be discharged.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Husky came to the correct conclusion in holding
that “actual fraud” does not require a misrepresentation by the debtor to the
creditor.245 This decision, however, will likely do little to stem the tide of
litigation arising out of Section 523(a)(2)(A).246 As long as courts and
legislatures continue to use the “badges of fraud” approach in determining
whether a debtor has engaged in “actual fraud,” creditors will continue to
hale innocent but vulnerable debtors into court or force settlements outside
of court where predatory creditors take advantage of the vulnerability of the
debtors who truly do need the protection that bankruptcy provides.247
If Congress adopted the “strong inference” pleading standard used in
private securities litigation, courts would have to do a more searching
inquiry into the actual motives and intentions of debtors. The new standard
would avoid excepting from discharge the debts of a variety of groups of
innocent debtors, like the ones discussed above.248 Congress, in making
this change, would preserve the meaning of “actual fraud” and clarify its
intentions in adding the “actual fraud” language to Section 523(a)(2)(A),
while reducing the volume of related litigation and the potential for
innocent debtors to be unfairly strong-armed by their creditors.

242. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (2016) (noting all of the businesses
Ritz held ownership in, his percentage of ownership, and the amount of money he transferred to
them from Chrysalis).
243. In re Ritz, 459 B.R. 623, 629, 636 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d, 513 B.R. 510 (S.D.
Tex. 2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Husky Int’l Elecs.,
Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re Ritz, No. 14-20526,
2016 WL 4253552 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2016) (“The Court finds Ritz is not a credible
witness . . . this Court shares Husky’s view that the Debtor is not an upstanding businessman who
can be trusted.”).
244. Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1585 (noting that Ritz could have used the
transferred money to pay Husky what it was owed).
245. See supra Part II.A.
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. See supra Part II.B.
248. See supra Part II.B.

